An archetype is a recognisable story computed from the register alone — a company's multi-year accounts and sector baseline, or a person's ownership record across every company they touch. Not a score: a set of conditions you can point at. Counts are live; every entry has a full page with its exact signature and the play it suggests.
For searchers, funds and advisers originating acquisitions.
founder-led B2B tech at 40–200 staff, growing and structurally profitable, no outside equity on the register — the bootstrapped growth-buyout profile (£5–15m ARR class)
founder-led professional-services firm at scale (accountancy, legal, consultancy, IFA, insurance broking) in a sector PE is actively consolidating — sells well above the base rate
cash is over half of net assets (≥£500k) while headcount stalls — the owner is stockpiling liquidity and winding the business down; the deal can finance itself
a consolidation-vertical player whose owner already shows an exit posture — cash-rich or a clean compounder; the strongest sale cells in the whole backtest, up to well above the base rate within a year
a cash-rich owner running a quiet compounder — the two strongest sale signals stacked (well above the base rate); the warmest buyout lead we score
founder-led care / dental / veterinary business at scale in an active consolidation vertical — sells 2.1× the base and almost never fails
founder-led HVAC / electrical / plumbing / fit-out contractor at scale — the trades consolidation theme, sells well above the base rate
retirement-age owner (62+) sitting on cash worth 40%+ of the balance sheet — the pre-sale posture the backtest actually links to a sale (well above the base rate; replaced the weaker 'sunset harvester')
net assets have grown three years running with a steady team — a healthy, boring, cash-generative business (sells 1.6× the base, almost never fails): the clean PE / trade acquisition target
25+ year old operating company with ZERO charges ever registered and real net assets — unencumbered balance sheet, the deal can be financed against the company itself
founder-led haulage / warehousing / distribution business at scale in a consolidating vertical — sells well above the base rate
fixed assets shrinking while cash grows — the owner is converting the business into money ahead of a deal; sells well above the base rate within a year, and these companies do NOT die (half the pool's failure rate)
fixed assets ≥£500k on a sound business — the leveraged and low-equity acquisition profile; where the accounts disclose land, plant or vehicles those assets can also secure the deal (ABL, sale & leaseback, machinery refinance)
the fixed-asset base jumped 30%+ in a year — heavy investment that needs asset finance and, the backtest says, often precedes a sale
an owner-led business scaling up — 10+ staff and headcount rising two years straight on a solvent balance sheet; growth attracts buyers: sells well above the base rate while failing at half the pool's
owner at retirement age (62+) of a real, solvent company — profile, not story: the broad buyout denominator that the story patterns refine (formerly the 'hot' slice)
owner 70+ in sole control of a profitable 15+ year company with no younger generation in the ownership — likely to consider a sale before ever appointing an adviser
the owner has died (estate) or is 70+ with a co-owner who is 65+ — succession skipped a generation and is now due twice over
owner 65+ actively controls 3+ companies and has ALREADY exited at least one — a serial seller mid-divestment; talk about the rest
a newly incorporated holding company was slotted above the trading company by its own owner — pre-sale / MBO structuring; the approach window is open right now
a 60+ serial owner has ceased control of 2+ companies within 24 months and still holds this one — the divestment is happening now, not someday
For private credit, ABL and refinance originators.
trade debtors ≥£250k while cash tightens on a growing book — the receivables can carry an invoice-finance or ABL facility
net assets negative AND deepening, with outstanding charges and real scale — a leveraged business that burned through its equity and needs to refinance the debt (and often raise fresh equity to keep scaling). Owner age is irrelevant here. Excludes companies whose control changed recently, a tell that the recap already happened. Walk-forward on the live base these companies refinance at well above the base rate and take non-bank credit at well above the base rate — the strongest credit tell in the pattern set.
land & buildings ≥£500k on the books with little or no secured debt — capital can be raised against the property (commercial mortgage, equity release, bridging)
physical stock ≥£500k with cash tightening on stable revenue — working capital is trapped on the shelves; inventory finance or ABL frees it
the latest accounting period was lengthened to 15+ months after years of annual filings — the classic 'buy time' move, made 12–18 months before trouble becomes visible
in the Altman distress zone yet carrying real fixed assets — the company survives on its asset base: an asset-based lending / rescue-finance target, not a walk-away. Refinances at well above the base rate and takes non-bank credit at well above the base rate (walk-forward, live base).
a ≥25% partner ceased within ~2.5 years and cash fell ≥30% — the company likely bought the partner out of its own pocket; fundamentally sound, drained by the exit — refinance the buyout
two or more independent strain marks (cash −30%, negative working capital, revenue down, loss, overdue accounts) before any formal insolvency event — the intervention window is still open
headcount up ≥25% YoY while cash fell ≥30% and creditors rose — growing faster than it can finance itself; a textbook working-capital borrower
a distressed company that ALSO stretched its accounting period to buy time — hiding a bad year on top of real trouble; fails 3×+ the base rate, the strongest failure signal we score
3+ consecutive years of declining net assets or headcount — no single event a bank would notice, but the trajectory is unambiguous
Altman Z'' in the distress zone (<1.1) — the academically calibrated bankruptcy predictor, computed from the filed balance sheet (plus the P&L where disclosed)
current assets have fallen below short-term creditors and the ratio is still worsening — the classic run-up to a cash crisis (1.7× the failure rate)
headcount down ≥10% YoY while the sector's median headcount is flat or growing — the decline is the company's own, not the industry's; the strongest form of 'shrinking'
the owner of a struggling company has incorporated a fresh same-trade company — the pre-pack playbook; creditors of the old shell should move now
an active charge aged 3.5–6 years and nothing new taken since — the facility is maturing and the refinance decision is ahead: 4.4× the refinance base rate (walk-forward, live base)
a bank held security here before, the latest secured lender is non-bank — the bank stepped away and alternative capital took its place: 8.5× the refinance base rate and 4.9× on non-bank credit, the strongest credit tell in the pattern set
three or more charges satisfied over its life with security still outstanding — a business that treats debt as a rolling tool and re-enters the market on a cycle: 7.7× the refinance base rate
two or more new charges from different lenders inside 12 months — leverage building fast across several balance sheets: 17.6× the refinance base rate and 12.3× on non-bank credit, the hottest credit cohort measured (and a risk flag as much as a lead)
the first invoice-finance / factoring lender just appeared on the register — working capital is being financed against the debtor book: 8.8× the refinance base rate, 5.7× on further non-bank credit
financed by NON-bank security only, and the numbers are improving — a company that has outgrown alternative pricing and can now be refinanced by a bank: refinances at well above the base rate, and 28% of refinances out of non-bank debt land at a bank
an SH01 share allotment in the last 24 months while net assets kept falling — rescue equity going in: 4.0× on non-bank credit AND 3.6× on an external sale (rare — a few hundred companies at a time)
The same idea run over people rather than companies: a story computed from the ownership record — exits, timing, portfolio size, whether they run what they own. Each is also a filter on the operator board.
65 or older and has exited at least one company in the last two years. Not a guess about intent — the exit already happened; the rest of the portfolio is what remains to be settled.
Left two or more companies within 24 months. Whatever is driving it — retirement, health, a change of plan — it is moving quickly.
Has exited two or more companies over their career. Selling is established behaviour for this person, not a one-off.
Controls ten or more companies. Individual holdings are positions rather than a life's work, and positions get traded.
Has started exiting and still holds others. The remaining companies are the ones left to deal with.
Not target archetypes, and their sale lift is zero by design rather than by omission: one describes the counterparty you sell to, the rest qualify how a person holds what they hold.
Three or more active holdings and two or more added in the last two years. This is a BUYER — the counterparty for a sale, not a target.
Has exited repeatedly and holds one company or none. The end of a career rather than a portfolio manoeuvre.
Five or more directorships over their career, still active on at least one board. A professional operator: reachable, board-literate, and rarely the emotional owner of any single business.
Runs a company they also control. The business depends on them personally, so succession is a real constraint, not a formality.
Resigned two or more directorships in the last two years and taken none on. A career being wound down one mandate at a time — often the overture to selling what they still hold or run.
Two or more new directorships inside two years with none dropped. Someone assembling influence or an operating group — read alongside the acquirer patterns, not the sale ones.
Owns without directing — someone else runs it. Already at arm's length, which usually makes a sale easier to contemplate.